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A B S T R A C T
We review a theory of homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control within the Active
Inference framework. Our aim is to connect two research streams that are usually considered
independently; namely, Active Inference and associative learning theories of animal behaviour. The
former uses a probabilistic (Bayesian) formulation of perception and action, while the latter calls on
multiple (Pavlovian, habitual, goal-directed) processes for homeostatic and behavioural control. We
offer a synthesis these classical processes and cast them as successive hierarchical contextualisations of
sensorimotor constructs, using the generative models that underpin Active Inference. This dissolves any
apparent mechanistic distinction between the optimization processes that mediate classical control or
learning. Furthermore, we generalize the scope of Active Inference by emphasizing interoceptive
inference and homeostatic regulation. The ensuing homeostatic (or allostatic) perspective provides an
intuitive explanation for how priors act as drives or goals to enslave action, and emphasises the
embodied nature of inference.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Abbreviations: CS, conditioned stimuli; US, unconditioned stimulus; PFC, prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplemental motor area; IC, inferotemporal cortex; AIC, anterior insular
cortex; PMC/MC, premotor/motor cortex; ipoT, ipothalamus; ANS, autonomous nervous system; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PPC, posterior parietal cortex; VTA/SN, the
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1. Introduction
The animal must respond to changes in the environment in such a
manner that its responsive activity is directed towards the
preservation of its existence. This conclusion holds also if we
consider the living organism in terms of physical and chemical
science. Every material system can exist as an entity only so long as
its internal forces, attraction, cohesion, etc., balance the external
forces acting upon it. [. . .] Being a deﬁnite circumscribed material
system, it can only continue to exist so long as it is in continuous
equilibrium with the forces external to it. Ivan Pavlov
Current associative learning theories in psychology and
neuroscience assume that animal behaviour depends on multiple
forms of control (i.e., Pavlovian, goal-directed, and habitual
processes). These control schemes are based on associations
between stimuli, actions and outcomes and are either innate or
learned through experience.
Our aim is to offer an integrative perspective by contextualizing
classical formulations of adaptive behaviour within the Active
Inference framework, which extends predictive coding from the
domain of perception to cover action (Friston et al., 2009). Active
Inference assumes that organisms act to fulﬁl prior expectations
that encode the (evolutionarily) values of their states (e.g., having
access to food). The mathematical foundation of Active Inference
rests on the notion of free energy minimization, where the long-
term average of free energy approximates the entropy of sensory
states. Minimizing free energy (and therefore entropy) enables an
organism to resist the dispersive effects of ‘‘external forces acting
upon it’’ to ensure ‘‘it is in continuous equilibrium with the forces
external to it’’ (Pavlov, 2010). Crucially, free energy can also be
interpreted in a statistical sense as an approximation to Bayesian
model evidence. This means Active Inference can be described
normatively as maximizing (a negative free energy bound on the
logarithm of) Bayesian model evidence. In other words, minimiz-
ing free energy reduces the discrepancy (e.g., prediction error)
between sensations and their predictions. This discrepancy can be
reduced by changing predictions – through perception – or by
selectively sampling sensory inputs that were predicted – through
action (Friston, 2010).
The basic premise of this article is that the ontology of
behavioural paradigms in associative learning can be seen as a
successive contextualisation of more elemental sensorimotor
constructs, within generative models of increasing hierarchical
depth. This formulation explains how the primitive sensorimotor
architecture of homeostatic control – of our early evolutionary
ancestors – evolved towards goal-directed and prospective forms
of control. This phylogenetic progression rests on the hierarchical
elaboration of more primitive architectures (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009). Furthermore, this hierar-
chical elaboration dissolves any apparent mechanistic distinction
between the optimization processes that underlie different control
or learning schemes, suggesting that they are all manifestations of
Active Inference – under various contexts or conditions (Friston
et al., 2009). This novel hypothesis contrasts with the standard
(associative learning) view that the computations underlying
different forms of behavioural control are fundamentally different
and appeal to different (optimization) principles.
We ﬁrst review associative learning theories of homeostatic and
behavioural control. We then offer an Active Inference formulation
of adaptive behaviour that fulﬁls homoeostatic imperatives in
increasingly sophisticated ways – building upon peripheral
(somatic and autonomic) reﬂexes to explain simple Pavlovian
and instrumental motor responses and, ﬁnally, complex goal-
directed behaviour. A crucial aspect of this hierarchical perspective
is that higher-level hierarchical representations contextualize
lower levels and predict longer sequences of cues and responses.
This is accommodated by predictions about transitions over
increasingly protracted time scales (Friston, 2008; Pezzulo, 2012).
2. Homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control in
associative learning theories
Cannon (1929) ﬁrst proposed that the evolutionary function of
physiology and behaviour is to restrict homeostatic states to a
physiologically tenable range. Homeostatic regulation therefore
allows animals to maintain a ‘‘continuous equilibrium’’ between the
internal milieu and environmental states, which (Pavlov, 2010)
considered the raison d’eˆtre for our brains.
The regulation of homeostatic states – or of allostatic processes
(Sterling and Eyer, 1988) – has long been described in terms of
control-theoretic and cybernetic mechanisms of error cancellation
and feedback control (Ashby, 1947). At the neurobiological level,
one hypothesis is that homeostatic control requires interoceptive
signals that report current homeostatic levels (e.g., the current level
of glucose in the blood) (Craig, 2010; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013;
Gu et al., 2013). A hungry animal can be described as an animal
whose homeostatic condition departs signiﬁcantly from a level
that is ‘good’ for survival. With some simpliﬁcations, the ‘good’
level of glucose is used as a reference for the controller to steer
action (e.g., ingest food to restore the level of glucose).
This form of autonomic regulation involves triggering auto-
nomic reﬂexes that control bodily processes such as heart rate,
blood pressure and peristalsis. Under some conditions, autonomic
reﬂexes can restore homeostatic levels (e.g., a hyperthermic
animal can cool down by perspiring). Although elemental,
autonomic reﬂexes are not sufﬁcient to fully support homoeos-
tasis: to satisfy hunger or thirst, the animal must act on the
external world. Early theories of homeostatic regulation focused
on simple (e.g., approach or avoidance) constituents of an innate
behavioural repertoire. However, higher animals learn to achieve
their goals in complex and ﬂexible ways that go well beyond
approach and avoidance. To do this they must acquire an adequate
behavioural repertoire and learn to select from currently available
actions or sequences of action (policies). This is the main focus of
associative learning theories in psychology and biology.
2.1. A taxonomy of behavioural controllers in the associative learning
literature
Contemporary associative learning theories assume that action
selection depends on the continuous cooperation and competition
of several behavioural controllers, which can be divided into
‘‘Pavlovian’’ and ‘‘instrumental’’ (goal-directed and habitual)
(Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, 2009).
Behavioural reﬂexes represent a basic form of controller that
constitutes the innate repertoire of most animals. This controller is
rather limited, as it calls on a limited set of unconditioned responses
(e.g., approaching and ingesting food or withdrawing from a
painful stimulus) in response to a circumscribed and predeﬁned
class of stimuli (called unconditioned stimuli). Still, this controller is
sufﬁcient for most animals to survive, even without any
experience-dependent learning.
Pavlovian (classical) conditioning is the process by which an
unconditioned stimulus (say, food), that triggers an unconditioned
reﬂex (say, salivation), is repeatedly paired with a neutral stimulus
(say, a bell). The pairing is thought to produce stimulus-stimulus
associations (between the food and the bell). After several pairings,
the (formerly) neutral stimulus is able – on its own – to trigger a
reﬂex called a conditioned response (salivation when the bell rings).
An evolutionary imperative for acquiring a conditioned response is
that the stimulus-stimulus associations capture (ecologically)
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valid statistical contingencies: if conditioned stimuli are good
predictors of unconditioned stimuli, they have inherent relevance
for survival. Classical conditioning mechanisms generally have
limited scope and only capture a small range of predeﬁned
responses – not the acquisition of novel behaviours.
More complex forms of associative learning guide the acquisi-
tion of instrumental responses, which are assumed to maximize
some goal or value function. Among these, ﬂexible forms of control
consider goal-directed actions. For example, while ingesting food
can be considered as a behavioural reﬂex for a hungry animal,
foraging for food is a complex skill – requiring the acquisition and
coordination of action sequences over time. Truly goal-directed
actions are considered to be oriented towards (and engaged by) a
goal (i.e., an action outcome, say the expected sound of a ringing
bell or the predicted sight or taste of a food).
Empirically, a behaviour is considered to be goal-directed if, and
only if, it is sensitive to changes in reward contingencies, as
revealed by reward devaluation and contingency degradation
paradigms (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). This sensitivity gives
goal-directed actions their characteristic ﬂexibility and context
sensitivity. However, this comes at a cost: to act in a goal-directed
manner an animal must know (learn) the causal effects of its
actions. This process is often described as the acquisition of sets of
associations (Dickinson, 2012), including (bidirectional) action-
outcome associations. When used in the forward direction (from
action to outcome), these associations permit the prediction of the
sensory consequences of possible actions. When used in the
backward direction (from outcome to action), the implicit mapping
enables the selection of an action that produces the (desired)
consequences. This computational perspective maps nicely onto
ideomotor theory (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997) and the
distinction between forward and inverse models of motor control
(Wolpert et al., 1998). Note that all these computations must be
contextualized, because any given action can produce different
outcomes in different situations. This implies that the selection of a
speciﬁc goal-directed action requires a complex computational
process (formally, the solution to an inverse problem). In this sense,
action selection depends on the sort of deliberation found in
model-based schemes, such as tree searches (e.g., used to solve
Markov decision problems) or ‘planning-as-inference’ (Botvinick
and Toussaint, 2012) – the latter being closely related to Active
Inference (see below).
A simpler kind of instrumental controller involves routines or
habits. Habits do not require purposeful deliberation and are
stimulus driven (not goal-driven): a stimulus activates simpler
‘‘cached’’ action-value representations, learned through experienc-
ing past reinforcements. This renders habitual computation quite
‘cheap’, but at the expense of ﬂexibility. For example, habitual
mechanisms do not adapt immediately to changes in reward
contingencies but need extensive re-learning.
The controllers considered above interact by cooperating or
competing. For example, it has been suggested that habitual and
goal-directed control compete to control action based on
uncertainty (Daw et al., 2005). In addition, various bidirectional
interactions between instrumental and Pavlovian mechanisms
have been proposed (Dayan, 2009). More recent formulations
emphasize cooperation, rather than only competition (Daw and
Dayan, 2014; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Keramati et al., 2011;
O’Doherty et al., 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2013; see also Daw et al.,
2011; Lee et al., 2014) for relevant empirical evidence that
supports an integrative viewpoint. In particular, these accounts are
consistent with the current view in that it is the precision or
reliability of alternative controllers that arbitrates their relative
contribution. These treatments rest on normative principles and
explore various trade-offs between (mental or ﬁctive) exploration
and exploitation; for example, trading fast inaccurate solutions for
slow accurate solutions. However, these formulations tend to
assume that different controllers conform to distinct computa-
tional principles (say, model-based vs. model-free) and – with
some noteworthy exceptions (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2012; Pezzulo
and Castelfranchi, 2009) – do not consider how more complex
controllers could have developed from earlier (less ﬂexible)
controllers.
Below, we introduce a view of adaptive behaviour in which
behavioural controllers are assimilated successively into an Active
Inference scheme; showing how more complex forms of control
are elaborated from simpler processes – thereby contextualizing
and linking them hierarchically in terms of their temporal and
functional scope.
3. Homeostatic processes and adaptive behavioural controllers
in Active Inference
Active Inference assumes that the brain is a statistical organ
that learns a generative model of its environment (Dayan et al.,
1995; Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2009; Helmholtz, 1866). The
theory extends predictive coding to the domain of action-
perception loops. In predictive coding, perception is regarded as
an inference process (Gregory, 1980), whose aim is to minimize
prediction errors or the difference between empirical priors (which
play the role of perceptual hypotheses) and current sensations.
Empirical priors are just representations or expectations that
provide top-down predictions in hierarchical models of how
sensations are generated. Prediction errors at every level of the
hierarchy are then minimized by adjusting (empirical) prior
expectations. This optimization process can be understood,
neurobiologically, as recurrent message passing among levels of
the sensorimotor hierarchy. The resulting optimization of prior
expectations or beliefs corresponds to perceptual inference.
Crucially, Active Inference considers another way to minimize
prediction errors; namely, through action.
The simplest form of action corresponds to peripheral reﬂexes,
which can be of an autonomic or somatic sort – depending upon
whether the muscles engaged are smooth or striated: see Fig. 1
(left). From the point of view of Active Inference, the purpose of a
peripheral reﬂex is to suppress proprioceptive or interoceptive
prediction errors through closed loop control (Friston, 2011). The
set point or equilibrium point of the reﬂex can be nuanced by
descending predictions that project to prediction error populations
(red triangles) that send efferents to neuromuscular junctions. This
efferent outﬂow will cease when the interoceptive or propriocep-
tive feedback matches the descending prediction (blue arrows).
3.1. Homeostatic regulation through autonomic reﬂexes and
unconditioned responses
The aforementioned control loop is usually associated with arc
reﬂexes and the suppression of proprioceptive prediction errors
through action (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Shipp et al., 2013). In
addition, the same loop can perform homeostatic regulation
through autonomic reﬂexes (Pezzulo, 2013; Seth, 2013; Seth et al.,
2012) – a process that has long been understood in terms of error
cancellation (Cannon, 1929). The Active Inference loop shown in
Fig. 1 (right panel) illustrates how autonomic reﬂexes minimize
interoceptive predictions and thus assure ‘good’ levels of
autonomic states. This process introduces a circular causality
between homeostatic variables and autonomic reﬂexes, as the
former triggers the latter and vice versa. Autonomic reﬂexes can
also facilitate other homeostatic reﬂexes, as illustrated in Ivan
Pavlov’s example of how salivation facilitates ingestion: ‘‘Edible
substances evoke the secretion of thick, concentrated saliva. Why?
The answer, obviously, is that this enables the mass of food to pass
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smoothly through the tube leading from the mouth into the
stomach.’’ (Ivan Pavlov, 1904 Nobel Lecture).
Although autonomic reﬂexes allow a continuous monitoring
and control of bodily events, they are not sufﬁcient for allostasis in
complex environments – animals must take action to survive.
Ultimately, actions must be selected that enable them to maintain
some states (e.g., glucose level) within a viable range; either
directly (homoeostasis) or indirectly (allostasis). However, allo-
static control is a difﬁcult control problem, as there is a necessarily
distal temporal relation between actions and their consequences,
particularly at the level of homeostatic regulation and interocep-
tion. For example, even if I act now (e.g., I eat or go foraging), the
level of glucose in my blood changes minutes or even hours later.
This so-called credit assignment problem makes closed loop
homoeostatic control of interoceptive prediction errors problem-
atic. How then should one choose the appropriate sequence of
actions to maintain homeostasis?
Many researchers have proposed that the solution to this
problem rests on re-representing bodily (and related) events
centrally, through various interoceptive channels (Craig, 2010) –
and also in the form of feelings that inﬂuence decision-making
(Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). In this vein, we suggest that the
best way to ﬁnesse the credit assignment problem is to learn
(hierarchical) models of how interoceptive signals are generated.
Much like perceptual hierarchies, these interoceptive models
predict interoceptive events over different timescales and thus
anticipate homeostatic needs.
Homoeostasis is often described as a reactive mechanism but
in fact it can be more sophisticated than that (Barrett and
Simmons, 2015). Animals do not actually react to hypoglycaemic
sensations, but much earlier, so that they can act (e.g., eat) before
dangerous and unpredicted internal states (e.g., hypoglycaemia)
are experienced. This anticipatory ability can be supported by
generative models describing how interoceptive signals change
over time, conditioned on some (future) behaviour. For example,
prior to an energy-consuming activity, one can anticipate its
hypoglycaemic consequences and prepare food. Many homeo-
static phenomena are periodic and this makes their prediction
possible, at least to some extent. Further, evidence indicates that
hormones linked to metabolic processes such as insulin (Woods
et al., 1970) and ghrelin (Drazen et al., 2006) can be conditioned
and initiate anticipatory allostatic processes. By analogy, using
interoceptive prediction errors to infer a preparatory behavioural
set – before homoeostatic extremis (e.g., profound hypoglycae-
mia) – allows animals to act in advance and, in essence, avoid
anticipated losses of glucose rather than react to actual losses.
Conceptually, this speaks to the tenet of the good regulator
theorem; namely, that any allostatic or homoeostatic system
must entail a model of its exchange with the environment (Conant
and Ashby, 1970).
Another pointer towards a hierarchical architecture is that – in
the brain – interoceptive and proprioceptive channels are not
directly interconnected at lower hierarchical levels; see Fig. 2.
While autonomic reﬂexes can directly minimize interoceptive
prediction errors through reciprocal message passing, arc reﬂexes
can only be engaged vicariously through higher (multimodal)
cortical and subcortical systems. The homeostatic variables that
have to be maintained within a safe range cannot be (technically
speaking) controlled directly. In other words, it is not possible to
use interoceptive prediction errors directly to enslave action in the
same way as proprioceptive prediction errors produce movement.
However, at a slower timescale, higher levels – that integrate
multimodal information including ascending interoceptive pre-
diction errors about impending homoeostatic violations – are in a
position to engage action through descending proprioceptive
predictions (see below).
In Active Inference, these central representations of bodily
events take the form of hierarchical generative models – models
that describe the consequences of sensorimotor contingencies at
multiple (exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive) levels.
The models are called ‘generative’ because they can generate – in a
top-down manner – the expected (sensory) consequences of latent
(hidden) causes.
The generative model shown in Fig. 2 links exteroceptive,
proprioceptive, and interoceptive information by jointly repre-
senting their hidden or latent causes (e.g., a cause can embody the
prior knowledge that the sight of a burger will produce certain
visual and gustatory sensations, that it affords a grasping action,
and ultimately that it increases the level of glucose in the blood).
The same idea arises in embodied predictive coding, where
perceptual inference minimizes both sensory and proprioceptive
error (Pezzulo, 2013). These models necessarily entail a sensori-
motor-to-interoceptive mapping that encodes associations between
sensorimotor and interoceptive events; say, ‘‘a burger in my
mouth’’ (a sensorimotor event) generates (and predicts) ‘‘more
glucose in my blood’’ (an interoceptive event). The acquisition of
these models is made possible by the fact that sensorimotor events
are reﬂected by variations in the interoceptive domain, as the two
are causally related (e.g., through the embodied gastric system).
The lowest levels of these models might be reiﬁed in anatomy; for
example, embodied in the functioning of the gastric system
(Mayer, 2011).
In sum, generative models linking sensorimotor and interocep-
tive events resolve a key aspect of homeostatic regulation. They
enable the use (and suppression) of sensorimotor prediction errors
as proxies for (the suppression of) interoceptive prediction errors,
Fig. 1. Peripheral reﬂexes in Active Inference. Left: the general structure of a (close) control loop, which applies to both the anatomy of classical motor arc reﬂexes and
autonomic reﬂexes. Right: Active Inference view of autonomic regulation (using the same scheme as the left graphic). Interoceptive prediction errors (e.g., the difference
between the expected level of glucose and the currently sensed level) can be suppressed by autonomic reﬂexes, much like proprioceptive prediction errors (e.g., the difference
between the expected and actual position of my ﬁnger) can be suppressed directly via arc reﬂexes.
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which are hard to control at short timescales. For example, I can
harness the association between ingesting a burger, the sensation
of a full stomach and the (future) restoration of blood glucose
levels. These associations mean that the exteroceptive prediction
errors (that report the fact that I am not currently eating) can be
resolved by acting (eating) to suppress interoceptive prediction
errors in the future. In this view, while the variable to be controlled
is homeostatic, the states that an organism controls are sensori-
motor (e.g., eating). This perspective also speaks to valence and
feelings – and their putative adaptive functions (Damasio and
Carvalho, 2013).
Fig. 3 shows an Active Inference formulation of unconditioned
responses. This is an extension of the reﬂexive control loop of Fig. 1
that places the peripheral reﬂexes under higher (central) control,
through the provision of descending predictions that provide a
reference point or set point. This architecture bridges the gap
between interoceptive signals (e.g., a gustatory input) and
autonomic responses (e.g., salivation). The (unpredicted) gustatory
sensations of food can elicit ascending gustatory prediction errors
that in turn elicit descending predictions of taste sensations and
(consummatory) interoception. The descending interoceptive pre-
dictions drive autonomic reﬂexes – mediating a stimulus-response
Fig. 2. Exteroceptive, interoceptive, and proprioceptive channels are partially separated in the brain. In this schematic, exteroceptive, interoceptive and proprioceptive
systems are shown as being relatively separated in terms of hierarchical neuronal systems. At the point of convergence – at higher levels of the hierarchy (here the Prefrontal
Cortex) – the representations become amodal or multimodal – providing descending predictions in the exteroceptive, autonomic and proprioceptive domains. These
descending predictions engage autonomic and motor reﬂexes by resetting their ﬁxed points while, at the same time, being informed by ascending prediction errors. AIC:
anterior insular cortex.
Figure adapted from Gu et al. (2013).
Fig. 3. Unconditioned responses. Dynamical control over the equilibrium point of peripheral reﬂexes rests on descending predictions about proprioceptive or interoceptive
input. Peripheral reﬂexes are now contingent upon top-down predictions that are themselves informed by ascending prediction errors from – in this example – gustatory
input. The timing of the various cues may or may not be important. In this cartoon, the temporal contingencies are modelled through interactions between the error (red) and
expectation (blue) populations at the top of the hierarchy. In dynamical schemes, these interactions produce an attractor or heteroclinic cycle that models the temporal
succession of predicted sensations (here, gustatory and subsequent interoceptive sensations).
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mapping. However, this mapping is established through the vertical
integration of predictions and prediction errors, in the sense of
hierarchical inference or predictive coding. This fact marks an
important difference with the associative learning literature, where
unconditioned responses are supposed to be controlled by cues (i.e.,
they are stimulus-response mappings). In Active Inference, they are
implemented within generative architectures that encode stimulus-
stimulus associations or contingencies, where responses are elicited
peripherally to minimize (interoceptive or proprioceptive) predic-
tion error. In this setting, a prediction encoded at higher hierarchical
levels (say, the sensation of tasting a burger) becomes an equilibrium
or ‘reference point’ in control-theoretic formulations.
Besides their importance per se, unconditioned responses are
crucial to scaffold increasingly more complex forms of behavioural
control that are acquired through learning (rather than being
innate). These new strategies essentially extend and contextualize
the animal’s innate repertoire of stimulus bound responses in an
open-ended way.
3.2. Towards more sophisticated forms homeostatic regulation: the
hierarchical architecture supporting adaptive behavioural control
Animals can come pre-equipped with a ﬁxed repertoire of
reﬂexes (e.g., approaching-food behaviour) enabling them to
satisfy their basic needs (e.g., hunger), under restricted conditions.
However, they can learn increasingly more sophisticated ways to
maintain homeostasis (e.g., from eating a food in front of me, to
opening a fridge, to buying food for dinner).
Associative learning theory describes these strategies in terms
of multiple behavioural controllers (i.e., Pavlovian, goal-directed
and habitual). In Active Inference, these forms of control are not
segregated, but it is possible to subsume them within a hierarchical
architecture that builds on the control loop shown in Figs. 1 and 3.
High levels in hierarchical models contextualize lower level
expectations through descending or backward connections, and
eventually, at the peripheral level of the hierarchy, nuance motor
and autonomic reﬂexes (which are thus conserved in an
evolutionary sense). In this scheme, a cascade of descending
predictions set the equilibrium points of reﬂexes, where these
predictions are – in principle – informed by deep hierarchical
processing.
We now review this formulation, beginning with a focus on
what associative learning theories call control, namely how
behaviour arises from different processes; and then considering
how these processes are learned in the face of new experience
(Mackintosh, 1983).
3.2.1. Pavlovian responses
Based on the central (sensorimotor) predictions in Fig. 3,
Pavlovian control arises when descending predictions encompass
predictive exteroceptive cues. In this case, the model acquires
exteroceptive-to-interoceptive sensory mappings, where the ﬁrst
sensory event is the conditioned stimulus (say a bell) and the
second is an unconditioned stimulus (say, the taste of a burger). As
shown in Fig. 4, the stimulus-stimulus associations underlying
Pavlovian conditioning are instantiated by a high-level represen-
tation of a conditioned stimulus that is inserted into the sequence
of expected events. This means that the conditioned stimulus (here
the sound of a bell) elicits auditory prediction errors that engage
top-down predictions of appropriate auditory input, which – at the
same time – predict the emergence of interoceptive sensations that
produce the unconditioned reﬂex. Descending predictions engage
peripheral reﬂexes – establishing a (vertical) link between the
conditioned stimulus and unconditioned response. Here, the
highest-level expectations absorb the unconditioned reﬂex into
dynamical predictions that support Pavlovian responses.
Fig. 4. Pavlovian responses. In this schematic, we have added a hierarchical level that incorporates exteroceptive predictions (here, of a ringing bell) into its model of state
transitions. This higher-level construct represents the sound of a bell that portends interoceptive changes that induce autonomic reﬂexes (or unconditioned responses).
Because the highest level now provides predictions in the exteroceptive and interoceptive domain, it enables perceptual inference to elicit autonomic responses, providing
interoceptive predictions that can be fulﬁlled by smooth muscle reﬂexes. Here, the agent’s model of the world involves a bell ringing that causes gustatory events that induce
salivation. Optimizing expectations about auditory objects corresponds to predictive coding of auditory input and the perception of bell ringing; while descending
interoceptive predictions cancel gustatory prediction error and descending predictions about the state of smooth muscle reﬂexively elicit salivation.
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Note that in this scheme, different hierarchical levels of the
generative model act in concert. The aforementioned closed loop
reﬂexes afford a basic (but restricted) repertoire of responses to
salient sensory events. Sensory-to-sensory associations expand
this initial repertoire beyond cues that are speciﬁed innately. The
hierarchical composition of models permits the open-ended
evaluation of sensory events and adaptation to changing environ-
mental contingencies (which would be precluded by purely innate
mechanisms). Finally, as we will see below, incorporating
proprioceptive predictions enables conditioned stimuli to garner
instrumental responses through classical motor reﬂexes.
It is worth noting that associative explanations of conditioning
– based on the pairing of (conditioned and unconditioned) stimuli
– have proven to be somewhat limited; for example, they do not
cover associations between stimuli and context. Rather, it has been
proposed that conditioning depends on expectations based on
knowledge of the relations between events at large (Rescorla,
1988). In terms of Active Inference, this implies that the generative
models not only encode associations between stimuli or between
conditioned stimuli and reward delivery; rather, they are latent
cause models that reconstruct the hidden processes jointly
responsible for context, sensory and reinforcing events (Courville
et al., 2006). Note that latent cause models have not been
generalized to instrumental responses – but this generalization is
straightforward in Active Inference, because the predictions
generated by the models can elicit action.
3.2.2. Instrumental responses
A further hierarchical extension now allows the addition of
proprioceptive and exteroceptive cues that lead to the Pavlovian
response. This provides a mechanistic basis for instrumental
behaviour, which is usually linked to habitual control in associative
learning models and permits adaptive behavioural patterns to be
stabilized through learning.
In the example shown in Fig. 5, imagine that an animal has
learned that a bell rings whenever its hand moves. This association
is encoded by high-level representations of the implicit conjunc-
tion of proprioceptive and auditory input that plays the role of a
sensorimotor construct or contingency (O’Regan and Noe, 2001).
Crucially, the motor responses producing the predicted proprio-
ceptive input will be elicited reﬂexively (through peripheral
reﬂexes), whenever they are engaged by descending predictions.
Note how the sound of a bell engenders posterior expectations
about the Pavlovian response that – mediated by prediction errors
ascending to the top of the hierarchy – will produce posterior
expectations about the conditioned response. This may be a
plausible mechanism for Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer (PIT) and
in particular PIT-speciﬁc phenomena (Corbit and Balleine, 2011).
3.2.3. Goal-directed behaviour
The aforementioned scheme can be equipped with a further
hierarchical extension that predicts contextual cues associated
with instrumental responses. Fig. 6 illustrates a simple example of
goal-directed behaviour – choosing somewhere to eat – which
extends the previous example using conditional or contextualizing
(exteroceptive) stimuli; e.g. a restaurant sign. In this example,
descending predictions select the conditional response through
adjusting the gain or precision of prediction errors at the lower
instrumental level in the hierarchy (circular arrowhead). In Active
Inference, a high precision implies that descending predictions will
dominate posterior beliefs. This ensures that the predicted
sequence of behaviour is enacted, through peripheral reﬂexes
Fig. 5. Instrumental responses. Here, we have supplemented the hierarchy of Fig. 6 to include proprioceptive precedents of a conditioned exteroceptive stimulus – here some
hand movement. This means that moving the hand induces expectations or predictions about the sound of the bell that, in turn, elicit lower-level expectations leading to a
conditioned response. In other words, this hierarchical extension enables Pavlovian conditioning to enslave instrumental responses.
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(Friston et al., 2012a). Later, we will consider the role of dopamine
in optimizing the precision of action selection in this way.
The key distinguishing feature of goal-directed systems rests on
the form of the inference they require. In contrast with Pavlovian
and instrumental controllers, goal-directed systems represent
(counterfactual) future states, and minimize the difference
between the preferred or goal state and outcomes predicted from
the current state. See Friston et al. (2013) for a formal example
using Markov decision processes. This prospective form of control
is supported by the ability of higher hierarchical levels to
anticipate the future and to select policies that enslave action
(Friston et al., 2010; Pezzulo, 2012).
In contradistinction to classical controllers, the generative
models described above capture increasingly more distal relations
between actions and outcomes (say choosing food from a menu or
even buying food to put in the fridge) that can be encoded in the
form of extended cue-response sequences in higher hierarchical
levels (Friston, 2008). They thus enable the modelling of
counterfactual outcomes and the selection of policies that allow
goals to be reached. Furthermore, these models can accommodate
generic priors, such as action costs. However, the prosecution of
control sequences still calls on exactly the same hierarchical
structures that underpin more elemental and unsupervised forms
of learning – right down to motor and autonomic reﬂexes in the
periphery.
3.2.4. The interaction between controllers in the Active Inference
framework
Associative learning theories hypothesize that behaviour
results from the interaction between different controllers. For
instance – in relation to goal-directed and habitual interactions –
an inﬂuential model proposes that the two controllers compete to
control behaviour on the basis of their relative precision or
conﬁdence (Daw et al., 2005). In Active Inference, the apparently
distinct forms of control map onto speciﬁc levels within a single
hierarchical architecture. Indeed, the different controllers can be
represented along a continuum from sophisticated goal-directed
models (Bayesian graphs) to simpler sensorimotor loops or
subgraphs. Higher order levels contextualize lower levels through
backward connections that provide empirical priors. Crucially,
these descending expectations optimize both content and context
– in the form of expected states and expected precision, respectively.
The descending inﬂuence of higher order levels depends on the
relative precision (or conﬁdence) of prediction errors at each level
of the hierarchy. When higher levels have greater precision, their
contextual inﬂuence dominates; whereas, when expected sensory
precision is high, inference and subsequent behaviour is driven by
sensory evidence. This ﬁts comfortably with the relative inﬂuence
of hierarchically deep (goal directed) and shallow (habitual) levels
of control that are balanced in terms of their relative salience or, in
predictive coding, precision (FitzGerald et al., 2014).
In Active Inference, control is not dichotomized into two discrete
systems, but viewed as distributed along a graded continuum going
from the highest levels of abstract, prospective and conscious
reasoning to more concrete, short-sighted unconscious levels of
reasoning down to the arc reﬂex. See Bates and Elman (1993), for
similar considerations in the context of connectionist models.
Within this framework, phenomena usually interpreted as arising
from conﬂict between different controllers (e.g., goal-directed vs.
habitual) can be reinterpreted as the failure of high-order levels to
contextualize lower-order levels. For example, devaluation occurs
when an animal – after learning an action-outcome contingency
(e.g., lever pressing to obtain food pellets) – stops performing the
action after the outcome associated with the action has lost is
palatability (e.g., after satiation). A large body of evidence has shown
that overtrained, contrary to undertrained, rats are unaffected by
devaluation, since they continue to perform the action even when
the associated outcome ceases to be palatable (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998). Current associative learning theories interpret
the resistance to devaluation in overtrained rats as a replacement of
Fig. 6. Goal-directed responses. In this ﬁnal extension, we have added contextual exteroceptive cues (e.g., a restaurant sign) that enable the highest level to select the
sensorimotor contingencies underlying instrumental or conditioned responses. Goal-directed behaviour can be regarded as the highest level of (model-based) control that
embodies all the ingredients of Active Inference.
G. Pezzulo et al. / Progress in Neurobiology 134 (2015) 17–3524
goal-directed control – based on action-outcome contingencies – by
habitual control – based on stimulus-reward learning.
From an Active Inference perspective, a resistance to devalua-
tion can be interpreted as a failure to contextualize low-level
instrumental inference (including sequences of predictions about
the proprioceptive sensations associated with the action perfor-
mance; e.g., those associated with lever pressing and food pellets
consumption) by higher levels that infer the motivational state.
This failure is due to the fact that the low level, after over-training,
has acquired a relatively higher precision and is therefore
unaffected by descending predictions that have access to
motivational information. Although higher levels may ‘know’ that
performing the action will not lead to a valuable outcome, they
have lost the ability to attenuate the precision of sensory levels
during overtraining (where the animal has learned this attenuation
is redundant). This can be modelled in the Active Inference
framework by placing a high precision on sensory prediction
errors, which can then activate reﬂexes directly.
More generally, placing a high precision on sensory prediction
errors produces habitisation (i.e., the shift from goal-directed to
habitual control), where habits directly activate reﬂexes and
preclude (unnecessary) inference at higher hierarchical levels. This
produces the equivalent of a so-called habitual controller, which
does not depend on goals encoded at higher hierarchical levels but
rather acts reactively. In other words, a stimulus (say, the visual
impression of a lever) triggers descending predictions of lever
pressing sensations, which (when afforded high precision) engages
an arc reﬂex. Lever pressing then minimizes (precise) sensory
prediction error, even when the further consequences of pressing a
lever, say receiving food, are neither predicted nor desired.
Habitisation can help saving (cognitive or other) resources, but
it could also be involved in some forms of addiction. For example,
an initially outcome-based drug taking behaviour can become
insensitive to the actual effects of the drugs, and be controlled
directly by a drug-predicting cue (Robbins and Everitt, 1999).
Habitisation can occur at multiple levels of a hierarchical
architecture. However, the lower levels of the generative models
may be habitised ﬁrst, because they deal with more elemental,
stereotyped and reproducible responses. With practice (e.g., elite-
level sport skills), habits can include longer sequences of actions
(Dezfouli and Balleine, 2012) and also possibly involve higher
hierarchical levels (Pezzulo et al., 2010).
This normative view of the interactions between goal-directed
and stimulus-bound actions rests on ﬁnding an optimal balance
between the (computational) costs and beneﬁts of inference.
Indeed, once an action or skill is learned and is sufﬁciently reliable,
it can be called upon with minimal processing costs and thus
becomes a habit. Let us imagine that an animal is learning the
contingencies between an action (say a lever press) and its
consequence (say the appearance of some food that the animal can
consume). When the contingency between a stimulus (the
appearance of the lever), the action (pressing) and the ensuing
reinforcement (consumption of the food) is reliable, the animal
should stick with the habitual and reinforced lever pressing action
rather than performing a model-based search for a better option.
This example illustrates that a hierarchical architecture for
adaptive control leads to the problem of exploration vs. exploitation
(Baum, 2004; Pezzulo et al., 2013), where a model-based search (a
covert form of exploration) should only be performed if its
expected beneﬁts – in terms of reinforcement – exceed its
computational costs; otherwise the habitual lever pressing action
should be directly exploited.
In Active Inference, free energy minimization solves this
dilemma for free. Technically, the objective function in Active
Inference is a free energy bound on the logarithm of Bayesian
model evidence. This bound can be decomposed into accuracy and
complexity. If the model is sufﬁcient to accurately predict a
succession of stimuli associated with habitual responding, then
further optimization can only be achieved by minimizing
complexity costs. This is exactly the same as removing (redundant)
model parameters that hitherto provided top-down contextual
control. Indeed, in a world where habitual responding always leads
to valuable outcomes, it is suboptimal to contextualize habits –
because this would lead to generalization failures and ultimately to
‘‘overﬁtting’’, in the same way over parameterized statistical
models tend to ﬁt ‘noise’ in the data rather than capturing
regularities. In other words, sensory cues are usually appropriate to
trigger the right (habitual) action, without needing to postulate
additional hidden or latent variables. However, occasionally cues
can be misleading and thus habitual controllers would prescribe an
inappropriate action. It is exactly these rare occasions that are
exploited experimentally to assess whether an animal is under the
control of a habitual or a goal-directed mechanism (e.g., in
devaluation paradigms).
Resistance to devaluation and habitisation also illustrates how,
in Active Inference, attention modulates the relative precision of
the different levels of the hierarchy (Feldman and Friston, 2010).
Attention can favour the integration of contextual information by
increasing the precision of higher-level representations, for
instance facilitating goal-directed control over a habitual response.
This mechanism is important in several circumstances where
contextualization becomes adaptive. Cognitive conﬂict occurs in
behavioural paradigms such as the Stroop and the Flanker tests
(Botvinick et al., 2001). In these, the goal-directed system needs to
inhibit a prepotent maladaptive Pavlovian or habitual response.
Cognitive conﬂict emerges because both low-level representations
(Pavlovian or habitual) and goal-directed representations have
high precision. The conﬂict can be resolved when attention
resources increase goal-directed precision. Similarly, when an
error occurs along a sequence of habitual responses, the prediction
error triggers a change in expected precision and the deployment
of attention to increase descending goal-directed inﬂuences, thus
contextualizing habitual mechanisms and enabling corrective or
remedial responses. This mechanism would explain why habitual
actions (e.g., turning left at a crossroad because this is the path I
take every day) could be initiated but also successively reversed by
goals (e.g., after a habit-based preparation of a left turn, one can
decide to turn right because today I am not going to my ofﬁce). The
same scheme could support postdictive inference; for example, an
action can be initiated by habit (thus before its consequences are
fully predicted) and successively a goal-based prediction can be
generated to monitor and verify retrospectively that the con-
sequences were expected and desired.
To summarize, in Active Inference, there is a unique and Bayes
optimal solution for contextualizing hierarchical behaviours that is
based upon optimizing expected precision – very much in the same
way that we carefully evaluate the standard error of our
predictions based on scientiﬁc data. The expression of these
predictions, under different conditions, produces goal-directed
action or habits. The implicit ﬂexibility and context-sensitive
balance is therefore based on our relative conﬁdence in predictions
at different hierarchical levels. This speaks to a possible
phylogenetic trajectory of hierarchical brain architectures that
subtend more sophisticated forms of control by reusing and
contextualizing simpler control processes (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009).
3.3. Learning the generative models required for hierarchical
inference
In Active Inference, there is a crucial distinction between
inference and learning. Inference refers to the moment-to-moment
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estimation of the hidden causes of sensations and corresponds to
state or value estimation in standard models of behaviour. This
contrasts with learning the parameters of the models predicting
state transitions, which proceeds over much longer time scales and
corresponds to the sort of learning considered in reinforcement
and value-learning paradigms. Neurobiologically, inference can be
regarded as the (Bayes) optimal updating of synaptic activity
encoding expectations at different levels of the hierarchy, while
learning is normally associated with the updating of synaptic
efﬁcacy or connection strengths that encode causal structure and
contingencies in the world.
There are two levels of which models are acquired and
optimized in Active Inference. First, the parameters of any given
model can minimize prediction error averaged over suitably long
periods of time; this corresponds to changes in connection
strength that conform to Hebbian or associative plasticity (Friston,
2008). One interesting aspect of this (activity dependent) plasticity
is that it is modulated by the precision or gain applied to
postsynaptic responses (of neuronal populations encoding predic-
tion error). In other words, prediction error is used as a teaching
signal for learning – as in standard reinforcement learning models
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Watkins and
Dayan, 1992); however, the learning rate is mediated by precision
(Mathys et al., 2011). This has the interesting consequence of
assigning dopamine a modulatory role in enabling plasticity based
upon prediction errors – as opposed to reporting the errors per se
(see later).
The second way in which models can be optimized is to
change the parameters or neuronal connections themselves – at
an evolutionary or somatic (neurodevelopmental) time scale.
There have also been proposals that synaptic homoeostasis (and
regression) during sleep is a manifestation of model optimiza-
tion (Hobson and Friston, 2012). Notice here that the model is
being optimized, as opposed to the parameters or connectivity
of any given model. Model optimization is a well-studied
problem in statistics, where it is usually resolved through
Bayesian model comparison based upon model evidence.
Practically, log model evidence is usually approximated with
Bayesian information criteria or variational free energy (Penny,
2012). In exactly the same way, Active Inference schemes
suppose that the same (variational) free energy that is optimized
by inference and learning is used to compare and select
generative models in the brain. Indeed, at an evolutionary level,
people have proposed free energy functionals of adaptive
ﬁtness (Sella and Hirsh, 2005). Put simply, there is a well
deﬁned (free energy) functional of sensory data that scores the
quality of any generative model of environmental exchange.
This functional can, in principle, be used to decide whether to
add a connection or contingency to the model or, indeed, add a
hierarchical level.
We have stressed that apparently distinct control systems
can be gracefully integrated through hierarchical minimization
of prediction error or surprise. One can generalize this theme
and regard control, inference, and learning as hierarchically
nested beneath model optimization at different timescales;
where the imperative to minimize prediction errors (or
maximize model evidence) applies universally at all levels.
For example, evolution can be regarded as performing Bayesian
model selection to minimize (the long-term average of) free
energy, while – at a much faster timescales – our motor reﬂexes
minimize free energy by suppressing proprioceptive prediction
errors encoded by alpha motor neurons in the spinal-cord.
Indeed, Active Inference has even been applied to synaptic
remodelling, by considering the minimization of prediction
errors at the level of the dendritic tree (Kiebel and Friston,
2011).
4. Summary: motivated behaviour from the Active Inference
perspective
So far, we have mapped the constructs of associative learning
theories onto the hierarchical generative models of Active
Inference. Here, we summarize the treatment and provide a
general account of motivated behaviour.
In the associative learning literature, motivation is often
associated with the invigoration of behaviour towards salient
stimuli. It acts in concert with learning mechanisms that reinforce
and stabilize successful behaviours and ensures that they are
emitted in the future with a higher probability (Balleine et al.,
2009; Berridge, 2004). Despite a general consensus on the role of
motivation in the expression and acquisition of adaptive behav-
iour, formal descriptions have been more elusive.
In the Active Inference view, motivated behaviour is based on
the joint minimization of interoceptive and exteroceptive sensory
prediction error. The ﬁrst prediction error informs the current
motivational need (or drive) of an organism in terms of a
discrepancy between optimal homeostatic levels (e.g., hunger in
terms of low glucose) and the latter speciﬁes the sensory state or
goal that the animal has to produce (by acting) to keep its
homeostatic level in a viable range. Generative models of
increasing complexity (Figs. 3–6) provide a bridge between the
motivational and procedural imperatives. The implicit sensory
mappings enable the proprioceptive prediction error to be
minimized as a proxy for interoceptive prediction error. In brief,
deep hierarchical inference gives rise to control hierarchies that
ﬁnesse and contextualize adaptive responses. For example, hunger
provides a ubiquitous example of a hierarchically elaborated
concept that contextualizes behaviour. In the current setting,
hunger does not simply reﬂect an inference about hypoglycaemia
but the belief that if I act in this way, I will avoid (surprising)
interoceptive (low blood sugar) cues. This reﬂects the quintessen-
tially counterfactual nature of allostatic processing in hierarchical
models.
The thesis we pursue in this work is closely related to work on
reinforcement learning controllers – and especially hierarchical
controllers – for goal-directed and habitual action, and state space
models (Botvinick, 2008; Botvinick and Weinstein, 2014; Daw
et al., 2005; Dezfouli et al., 2014; Dezfouli and Balleine, 2012). Our
primary goal was to contextualize these more recent formulations
within a single (and principled) framework based upon hierarchi-
cal generative models. This (Active Inference) framework is
principled because it only assumes the brain is trying to maximize
the evidence for its hierarchical model of the world. All the
arguments in this paper (and related formulations) follow as
corollaries or necessary consequences.
Having said this, the proposed framework differs from current
associative and reinforcement learning theories in several impor-
tant aspects. First, in Active Inference, a unique strategy (free
energy minimization) produces different modes of control under
various circumstances. This stands in contrast with the view of
multiple independent controllers (Daw et al., 2005) and suggests
that the contributions of different behavioural modes are
orchestrated within a coherent statistical computation.
Second, previous models postulate a qualitative distinction
between different forms of control. Instead, we propose a
quantitative distinction, where different controllers correspond
to different levels in a continuum of abstraction – from the more
abstract goal-directed representations to the simple arc reﬂex.
Indeed, we regard the highest level of prospective reasoning –
conscious and expressed in linguistic form – contextualizes a more
concrete and ‘intuitive’ level of reasoning, which in turn
contextualizes more elemental levels and so on, down to the
lowest level of the hierarchy – the arc reﬂex. The level of the
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hierarchy that guides behaviour in a given moment (the level with
the highest precision), determines how much goal-directed (or
habitual) control is exerted over behaviour.
Thus, unlike most associative or reinforcement learning
theories (Daw et al., 2005), the proposed framework does not
describe habitual and goal-directed controllers as necessarily
competing. Instead, they are arranged in a hierarchical scheme in
which the latter contextualizes the former. There have been recent
proposals that address cooperation between the two controllers
(Daw et al., 2011; Keramati et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2014; Pezzulo
et al., 2013) and explicit proposals that they might form a hierarchy
(O’Doherty et al., 2015). Here, we are not only suggesting that the
two controllers might be hierarchically arranged, but that their
computations are essentially the same (acknowledging that they
operate at different hierarchical levels and on different represen-
tations and contingencies). This hypothesis contrasts with the view
that the human brain includes two separate systems for MB and
MF control, plus an arbitration system (O’Doherty et al., 2015). In
the perspective pursued here, there is only one controller that
realizes both goal directed and habitual behaviour, and in which
higher levels (that can be considered more goal-directed in the
spectrum) contextualize lower levels (that can be considered more
habitual). In this view, contextualization depends on the relative
precision processing at different hierarchical levels – where,
effectively, precision dynamics subsume the role of arbitration. In
this setting, hierarchical arbitration emerges in a principled way
from free energy minimization and conforms to Active Inference
principles, in which top-down and bottom-up message passing
updates predictions and prediction errors, respectively. This view
stands in contrast with the proposal that hierarchical message
passing involves commands, policies or reward prediction errors
(Botvinick, 2008; O’Doherty et al., 2015).
By the same token, the hierarchical scheme of Active Inference
differs from hierarchical reinforcement learning (Botvinick, 2008;
Botvinick and Weinstein, 2014). In hierarchical reinforcement
learning, an agent selects either a primitive action or a higher-level
action (e.g., an option); and this hierarchical scheme can extent to
many levels. In Active Inference, higher hierarchical levels
inﬂuence lower levels in a top-down manner, but do not replace
them. Furthermore, in Active Inference action selection and the
balance between hierarchical levels depend on the precision of the
representations at various levels, not on option- or action-speciﬁc
values. These two features also distinguish the proposed frame-
work from the hierarchical scheme of (Dezfouli et al., 2014;
Dezfouli and Balleine, 2012), where the conversion from goal-
directed to habitual systems depends on a ‘‘chunking’’ mechanism,
and the reverse transformation involves ‘‘decomposing action
sequences into single actions’’.
Furthermore, our scheme for behavioural control is based on
Bayesian inference and does not call on reward prediction errors for
learning or inference. One advantage of this is the concept of reward
is replaced by the realization of prior preferences. This means that
epistemic value and pragmatic value (e.g. utility or reward functions)
have the same currency and can be accommodated within the same
(information hungry) Bayesian scheme – where this Bayesian
scheme prescribes how agents can infer or learn reward contingen-
cies (Friston et al., 2015). Also, this normative approach enables an
implementation in terms of predictive coding and cybernetic
processes, which have some neurobiological plausibility (see Section
5). Although there have been other proposals involving Bayesian
inference and behavioural control (Friston et al., 2010; Pezzulo et al.,
2013; Solway and Botvinick, 2012), none has simultaneously
addressed all the controllers in the ontology of animal learning
theories, as offered below.
Another distinguishing aspect is that, in this framework, actions
are triggered by goals through prediction errors, whereas in most
reinforcement learning schemes, responses are triggered by
stimuli via associative links – and prediction errors have only a
role in learning (e.g., using Temporal Difference learning) (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). In this respect, Active Inference is closer to the
cybernetic view of purposive regulation (Miller et al., 1960; Seth,
2014) than to standard associative theories.
The current formulation is also deeply connected to theories
that emphasize the importance of interoceptive signals for
affective processing and decision-making (Craig, 2010; Damasio
and Carvalho, 2013) and especially the work of Seth and
collaborators on interoceptive inference (i.e., Active Inference
about interoceptive states) as a basis for emotion and conscious
presence (Seth, 2013; Seth et al., 2012). Here, we take a
complementary perspective and discuss the combined role of
interoceptive, exteroceptive and proprioceptive inference for
homeostatic control and adaptive action. By starting from different
angles, all these theories highlight multilateral roles of interocep-
tion, whose implications for enactive approaches to cognition (e.g.,
the affective consequences of goal achievement, and the associated
subjective states) remain an important challenge.
The Active Inference scheme for adaptive control connects well
with hierarchical and layered robotic control architectures (Arbib,
1992; Brooks, 1991; Tani and Nolﬁ, 1999; Verschure et al., 2003),
where higher levels encode goal-directed controllers or schemas
that contextualize lower-level reﬂex or habit-like control loops.
Some of these architectures also include a (simpliﬁed) internal
physiology that grounds higher-level goals (Verschure et al., 2014).
Active Inference solves the problems of action selection and
arbitration between levels that are implicit in these robot
architectures by using a unitary, biologically-motivated scheme: a
homogeneous process of free energy minimization based on a
cascade of (precision engineered) predictions and prediction errors.
Within this scheme, the balance between goal-directed and habitual
components of behaviour can be found in a principled way based on
considerations of model model ‘‘accuracy’’ vs. ‘‘complexity’’; see
above and (FitzGerald et al., 2014; Pezzulo et al., 2013). Furthermore,
Active Inference offers a principled scheme to coordinate the two
‘loops’ that, in these architectures, control physiologic needs and
drives (via interoceptive signals) and goal-directed action execution
(via proprioceptive and exteroceptive signals), respectively. It
remains to be seen if and how these features of Active Inference
architectures can be translated into more effective design principles
for autonomous goal-directed robots.
This new perspective has implications for the role assigned to
neuromodulators, and dopamine in particular. In reinforcement
learning, phasic and tonic facets of dopaminergic discharges are
assumed to encode reward prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997)
and average reward expectation, respectively (Niv et al., 2007). In
Active Inference, dopamine is associated with expected precision
(Friston et al., 2012a), which sets the relative gain of ascending
projections signalling prediction error (Friston, 2008),. The ensuing
precision control can be understood from several perspectives.
First, in a hierarchical scheme, precision regulates the predomi-
nance of each level of the hierarchy, with respect to other levels.
The function of dopamine that emerges is that of balancing the
relative precision of the different hierarchical levels and thus the
complexity of the generative model engaged for inference. As a
general rule, simulations suggest that phasic dopamine ﬁring
elevates the precision of beliefs (probability distributions) over
competing and hierarchically composed policies; thereby enabling
more precise action selection. This can explain the empirical
evidence that higher postsynaptic dopamine availability is
associated with enhanced motor vigour, for instance speeding
up reaction times (Berridge, 2004; Salamone and Correa, 2012),
and with a very fast ‘habitisation’ of behaviour (Gremel and Costa,
2013). Also, this can explain the observation from several cognitive
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tasks of an inverted-U function, relating dopamine levels to
performance (Cools and Esposito, 2011). This would be the
consequence of an optimal dopaminergic activity, which would
correspond to the engagement of the level of the generative model
with the best speed/accuracy trade-off. The ﬁnal point speaks to an
important issue; namely that the precision or conﬁdence about
future behaviour can itself be optimized with respect to free
energy or model evidence. In other words, there is an optional
precision of beliefs about any choice behaviour under uncertainty.
In Active Inference models of choice behaviour (Friston et al.,
2014, 2013), precision reports opportunities to achieve a goal (or
more precisely, conﬁdence in the opportunities) that invigorate
and select action; see Fig. 7. The expected precision or conﬁdence
about preferred outcomes reports on the progress towards the goal
– like spatial proximity or sub-goals (Lepora and Pezzulo, 2015;
Maisto et al., 2015) – and in accordance with early cybernetic
models of purposive action such as the Test-Operate-Test-Exit
(TOTE) model (Miller et al., 1960) precision can be updated (in a
Bayes optimal fashion) during goal-directed action – rather than
just mediating learning by reporting reward prediction errors. This
view is compatible with theories that describe dopamine function
within a ‘‘wanting’’ system (Berridge, 2004) that is not hedonic
(as in the ‘‘liking’’ system) but instrumental to goal pursuit
(Salamone and Correa, 2012).
Finally, precision regulates the gain of (postsynaptic) prediction
errors that drive associative (synaptic) plasticity (Friston, 2008).
The post-synaptic effects of dopaminergic projections from the
ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra varies across target
regions (e.g., different portions of basal ganglia and cortex), due, for
instance to the complex role of receptors such as D1 and D2 (Clark
and White, 1987). This prompts the hypothesis that the effects of
increased/decreased dopamine activity vary within and across
individuals – an idea that has inspired interpretations of several
symptoms and signs in neuropsychiatric disorders. For example,
there is much current interest in understanding a failure to
attenuate sensory precision as an explanation for several
symptoms and signs in neuropsychiatric disorders (Edwards
et al., 2012; Friston et al., 2012a).
Fig. 7 illustrates how a hierarchical scheme can explain one of
the cardinal features of dopaminergic discharges. In this example,
we used a T-maze to present conditioned stimuli (CS) in the form of
cues that indicated which arm was baited with a reward. Using a
simple Bayesian (variational) belief update scheme (see ﬁgure
legend) it is fairly simple to reproduce dopaminergic discharge
Fig. 7. This ﬁgure illustrates the functional anatomy implied by a simple message passing scheme based on variational Bayes, and generative models based upon Markov
decision processes; see (Friston et al., 2014) for details. It includes the following variables: observations (ot), expected states of the world (s
_
t), action (at), expected action
sequences or policies (p
_
) and their precision (g
_
). Q represents the quality of a policy scored in terms of its (epistemic) value or expected free energy. The equations corresponds
to (variational) Bayesian updates, where A and B are probability transition matrices mapping hidden states to observations and hidden states to hidden states under different
actions respectively. s is a softmax function. Left panel: here, we have associated the Bayesian updates of hidden states of the world with perception, control states (policies)
with action selection and expected precision with incentives salience. Right panel: this shows the results of a simulation in terms of simulated dopamine discharges, of the
kind that is usually associated with reward prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1997), but which can also be modelled under an Active Inference scheme. The key thing to note is
that the responses to an informative cue (or conditioned stimulus CS – blue) pre-empt subsequent responses to the reward (or unconditioned stimulus US – red). In this
simulation, the agent was shown a cue that resolved uncertainty (i.e., had epistemic value) about where to ﬁnd a reward in a simple T-maze (upper right panel). In this
context, dopaminergic responses appear to transfer from the US when it is encountered without (middle right panel) and with (lower right panel) a preceding CS.
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proﬁles that are similar to those observed empirically. In brief, the
conﬁdence about subsequent behaviour is encoded by dopamine
(whose phasic discharges increase the precision of probabilistic
beliefs about competing policies). The ﬁgure compares (simulated)
dopamine responses to the CS and unconditioned stimulus (US or
reward) before the agent knows where the reward is and after it
has inferred its location. This example shows that hierarchical
inference offers a sufﬁcient explanation for dopamine responses in
terms of the conﬁdence or precision about subsequent behaviour.
Here, the CS has epistemic value because it resolves uncertainty
about subsequent (goal directed) behaviour. Under these circum-
stances the CS elicits a burst of dopamine ﬁring that is effectively
transferred from the US to the CS. See Friston et al. (2015) for
details of this particular example.
A ﬁnal important point concerns the relationship between
drives and goals. In most psychological theories, drives are usually
linked to basic motivations and homoeostasis (e.g., interoceptive
hunger or thirst), while goals are considered to have more
elaborate (exteroceptive) sensory and cognitive aspects (e.g.,
dining in a restaurant), but their relations are often unclear from a
mechanistic viewpoint (Pezzulo et al., 2014b; Verschure et al.,
2014). In Active Inference, goals are ultimately grounded in
expectations about physiological allostasis, and engage a cascade
of interoceptive, proprioceptive and exteroceptive loops. The
objective is to suppress interoceptive prediction errors (Barrett and
Simmons, 2015; Pezzulo, 2013; Seth et al., 2012) through action,
which in turn requires bodily signals to be represented centrally
and controlled through a deep hierarchical modelling that –
crucially – engages proprioceptive and exteroceptive loops. This
implies that at every level of the hierarchy, goals of different
complexity are represented that can be distally (and evolutionari-
ly) related to homoeostasis but at the same time are (conditionally)
independent from them. Here, conditionally independent means
that goals have autonomy in steering and controlling behaviour;
for example, the goal of ‘going to a fancy restaurant’ is certainly
linked to the drive to eat (or socialize) but it can induce restaurant-
searching behaviour in the absence of hunger. Furthermore, going
to a restaurant does not in itself cause a reversal of hypoglycaemia.
The ‘autonomisation’ of goals from primary drives is a key feature
of higher animals like humans (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009)
and becomes more evident in pathological conditions, where
certain goals such as gambling can become pathological and
maladaptive (Montague et al., 2012). Autonomy is a general
characteristic of hierarchically organized architectures that,
necessarily, embody conditional independencies and enable
organized behaviour over extended timeframes.
This account thus goes beyond purely Hullian, drive-minimi-
zation theories of motivation and emphasizes that an important
part of motivated behaviour is directly guided by goals and internal
representations of desired future states. Basic drives associated
with evolutionary imperatives (e.g., good levels of glucose)
naturally constrain the acquisition of new empirical priors that
deﬁne goals at some (high) level of an agent’s generative model. In
turn, these high-level priors contextualize behaviour that is
internally consistent with lower-level drives provided they are
afforded sufﬁcient precision. Although the ultimate reason for
the emergence of goals is that they satisfy some internal drive, the
activation of a speciﬁc goal might or might not be caused by
concurrent interoceptive inference. Thus, the goal system supports
and – in a certain sense – supersedes the drive system: (Montague,
2006) speculates that the goal system capitalizes on existing brain
architectures for (reward) prediction errors and reuses it in an
open-ended way. In a similar vein, Passingham and Wise (2012)
discuss the adaptive advantages of the more advanced (prefrontal)
goal systems. They argue that the (new) prefrontal areas of
anthropoid primates extended the (older) reinforcement-learning
system, increasing its ﬂexibility and adaptability; for example, by
generating (foraging) goals from single learning episodes. The
resulting architecture for motivated behaviour frees higher
animals from the immediate demands of homeostatic regulation.
While this may predispose to maladaptive behaviour, it also
permits an open-ended proliferation of goals and desires that
characterize our human lives – because, as Baruch de Espinoza puts
it, ‘‘desire is the essence of a man’’.
5. Simplified functional anatomy of hierarchical Active
Inference
A simpliﬁed functional anatomy for the hierarchical Active
Inference scheme that we have discussed is shown in Fig. 8. This
should be considered as a schematic that organizes ideas about the
functional anatomy underlying active or embodied inference. This
sort of scheme should not be considered as a comprehensive
characterization of functional brain architectures: many compo-
nents are depicted very simplistically – and some brain areas are
not discussed at all. However, it may be useful as a general
framework about the functional neural organization and as a
working hypothesis for the interpretation and testing of empirical
studies. Here anatomical loops of increasing complexity are
proposed to embody the ‘gradient’ of control discussed earlier,
with the more elaborated goal-directed control loops that
contextualize the more elemental sensorimotor constructs within
generative models of increasing hierarchical depth. The different
levels of the Active Inference hierarchy are represented by a colour
gradient from violet (the highest level: prefrontal cortex, PFC), red
(supplemental motor area, SMA; Inferotemporal cortex, IC;
anterior insular cortex, AIC), orange (premotor/motor cortex,
PMC/MC; striatum; ipothalamus, ipoT) to yellow (autonomous
nervous system, ANS; motoneurons). Connections among areas
represent recurrent projections between areas that follow the
usual logic of predictive coding, where backward connections
convey descending predictions and forward connections pass
prediction errors.
Hierarchically higher areas play a more prominent role in the
goal-directed system, whereas orange areas predominate in the
Pavlovian and habitual systems. The central position assigned to
prefrontal areas at the apex of the goal-directed system is in
accordance with a large literature highlighting its importance for
ﬂexible cognitive control and executive function (Fuster, 1997;
Miller and Cohen, 2001). Evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that contextual representations of increasing abstrac-
tion and timescale are processed along a posterior-anterior axis in
PFC, suggesting that this region itself is hierarchically organized
(Koechlin and Summerﬁeld, 2007). Goal-directed control requires
the integration of information from different sources. This
corresponds in our model to the fact that the exteroceptive
network (including SMA, IC, striatum, MC and motoneurons – bold
circles) is anatomically segregated from the interoceptive network
(including AIC, ipoT and the ANS – dotted circles), but the two are
integrated at the multimodal highest level in the PFC, see Fig. 2 and
Gu et al. (2013). Goal-directed control also requires knowledge of
the contingencies between actions and outcomes (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998). This form of knowledge is encoded in various
ways – and at increasingly longer timescales – in motor, premotor,
and prefrontal brain areas, which overall form hierarchical control
loops.
Another brain structure with a primary role in goal-directed
control is IC and the closely related hippocampus. The ability of the
hippocampus to support goal-directed learning and behaviour has
been studied principally in spatial navigation (Buzsa´ki and Moser,
2013), but evidence suggests that this area also supports other
advanced cognitive abilities that require prospection, such as
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imagination of ﬁctive scenarios (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009).
From the associative learning perspective, the hippocampus has
been linked to a form of instrumental process called ‘episodic’
control. Speciﬁcally, the hippocampus is thought to store state-
action sequences that successfully attain a goal and then replay
those sequences when a constituent state is encountered (Lengyel
and Dayan, 2008). This ability to generate ﬁctive sequences of
states (Johnson and Redish, 2007; Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013) has
been interpreted in terms of reactivation in the context of
generative models (Penny et al., 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2014a,
2013). Furthermore, the hippocampus has been consistently linked
to memory consolidation (Buzsa´ki, 1996), a role that can be
characterized within Active Inference as the reporting of the
expected information, precision and novelty of sequential events
(Strange et al., 2005). In short, the hippocampus is an important
nexus for both the expression of goal-directed behaviour (possibly
via the covert replay of previous experiences encoded in the
generative models) and its acquisition (possibly by signalling the
opportunity to optimize or revise generative models).
In the hierarchical architecture depicted here, brain structures
controlling more complex strategies – that are mandated by goal-
directed behaviour and cognitive control – do not replace more
ancient brain structures underlying the simpler strategies based on
ﬁxed stimulus-response pairs, but contextualize them. In this way,
more elaborate forms of action control orchestrate more elemen-
tary sensorimotor architectures that support situated action or
affordance competition (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). In the present
scheme, this may involve cortical (motor and premotor) and
subcortical regions, such as the striatum and hypothalamus.
A widespread view is that different striatal territories (coupled
with limbic, associative and sensorimotor cortex) participate in
distinct cortico-subcortical loops – limbic, associative, and
sensorimotor, respectively – and support different aspects of
behavioural control (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). For example, the
dorsolateral striatum is thought to be more involved in stimulus-
response learning and habitual control, the dorsomedial striatum
has been linked to action-outcome learning and goal-directed
action, and ventral striatum to Pavlovian values (Glascher et al.,
2010; Liljeholm and O’Doherty, 2012; Mannella et al., 2013;
O’Doherty et al., 2004). In a related perspective, these striatal
territories might compute outcome predictions in parallel using
different kinds of information as input (Pennartz et al., 2011). In
this perspective, the model-based vs. model-free dichotomy is
replaced by a more nuanced view, in which striatal territories
embody different predictors (or models): from the more complex
outcome predictions in ventral and dorsomedial striatum (analo-
gous to model-based mechanisms), to the simpler predictions
about actions based on somatosensory and motor information in
the dorsolateral striatum (analogous to model-free mechanisms).
The idea that different striatal territories support different aspects
of behavioural control is coherent with the Active Inference
scheme where generative models are not purely cortical structures
but involve cortico-subcortical loops. In the perspective pursued
here, however, the striatal subdivision is conceived as in
hierarchical terms, rather than in terms of competition among
parallel controllers or predictors. This hierarchical view of striatal
computation is indeed supported by recent neurophysiological
evidence (Ito and Doya, 2015).
Fig. 8. Simpliﬁed functional anatomy of hierarchical Active Inference. Upper panel: different levels of the hierarchy are represented by a colour gradient from violet (the
highest level: prefrontal cortex, PFC), red (supplemental motor area, SMA; Inferotemporal cortex, IC; anterior insular cortex, AIC), orange (premotor/motor cortex, PMC/MC;
striatum; ipothalamus, ipoT) to yellow (autonomous nervous system, ANS; motoneurons). Blue areas (anterior cingulate cortex, ACC; posterior parietal cortex, PPC; and the
dopaminergic ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra, VTA/SN) are portrayed as part of an attentional network that modulates the relative precision of different levels in
the hierarchy. Lower panel: simpliﬁed schematic of the connections between brain areas of the upper panel. The lower-left panel shows the recurrent projections between
brain areas at different hierarchical levels (denoted by colour), and follow a predictive coding scheme: backward connections (e.g., from PFC to SMA) convey descending
predictions and forward connections (e.g., from SMA to PFC) pass prediction errors. The lower-middle panel shows the loops between cortical and subcortical brain areas at
different hierarchical levels, which include loops between nucleus accumbens/ventral striatum and orbital/ventral PFC; between caudate/dorsomedial striatum and
prefrontal/parietal association cortices; and between putamen/dorsolateral striatum and sensorimotor cortices (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). The lower-right panel exempliﬁes
the modulatory projections the attentional network to various cortical and subcortical brain areas (e.g., from VTA/SNT to PFC and striatum); and the distinction between areas
that form exteroceptive and interoceptive networks.
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Brain loops might extend beyond the striatum and include, for
example, the cerebellum, which – given its remarkably homoge-
nous microarchitecture – has been often assumed to be able to
encode a large repertoire of internal (generative) models required
to predict and control action and its timing (Caligiore et al., 2013;
Imamizu et al., 2003; Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert et al.,
1998). Embodied views of cognition suggest that the re-enactment
of the same perceptual-motor loops – and internally generated
brain dynamics – might realize increasingly complex cognitive
functions such as planning, imagery, and conscious thought
(Buzsa´ki et al., 2014; Grush, 2004; Hesslow, 2002; Jeannerod,
2001; Pezzulo, 2011; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009).
Motoneurons and autonomic effectors are found at the lowest
level of the hierarchy. These infrastructures constitute the basic
building blocks to enact arc reﬂexes and are exploited and
contextualized by the higher hierarchical levels. It is worth noting
that in the Active Inference scheme, motor areas represent
proprioceptive predictions and not motor commands (as tradi-
tionally assumed), in the same way as sensory (e.g., visual) areas
represent exteroceptive predictions (Adams et al., 2013). Moto-
neurons are responsible for activating arc reﬂexes that fulﬁl these
predictions, thus guiding overt action. They are thus the locus
where predictions are unpacked in a kinematic frame of reference
and transformed into overt action.
In addition to the higher-to-lower control hierarchy, the Active
Inference scheme requires an attentional network that modulates
the relative precision of different levels in the hierarchy. In Fig. 8
this role has been assigned to the blue areas (anterior cingulate
cortex, ACC; posterior parietal cortex, PPC; and the dopaminergic
ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra, VTA/SN). We
hypothesize that ACC and PPC (linked preferentially with higher
order areas through recurrent connections) are involved in
modulating the relative precision of PFC relative to lower level
areas; whereas VTA/SN (projecting widely to all other areas) is
more important in regulating the precision of exteroceptive and
interoceptive sensations (blue connections). The attentional
network has an important role in the balance between more
cognitively complex goals and more elementary ones, maintained
at different hierarchical levels, which is an important hallmark of
cognitive control (Fuster, 1997; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Here,
cognitive control entails a high degree of precision of ‘‘higher’’
areas such as PFC, so that more cognitively complex and long-term
goals dominate the inference (Pezzulo, 2012; Stoianov et al., 2015).
However, in some cases, such as in drug addiction, some aspects of
prefrontal function decline and the agent becomes unable to
contextualize or suppress (hierarchically lower) cortico – dorsal
striatum loops that implement habits (Belin et al., 2009).
In sum, we propose a hierarchical neural architecture that
extends from cortical areas to peripheral reﬂexes. This hierarchy is
organized according to the level of abstraction of representations
embodied by the different areas. The neural architecture is based
on predictive coding, which constitutes a Bayesian inference
machine that guides both perception and action.
5.1. Empirical evidence supporting the proposed framework and novel
predictions
Active Inference rests upon, and extends, a predictive coding
scheme, which provides an explanation for many aspects of
functional brain architectures. In brief, it explains the hierarchical
nature of cortical connections; the prevalence of backward
connections and explains many of the functional and structural
asymmetries in the extrinsic (between region) connections that
link hierarchical levels (Zeki and Shipp, 1988). These asymmetries
include the laminar speciﬁcity of forward and backward connec-
tions, the prevalence of nonlinear or modulatory backward
connections (that embody interactions and nonlinearities inherent
in the generation of sensory signals) and their spectral character-
istics (Adams et al., 2013; Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2008). The
speciﬁc evidence for predictive coding in the motor system is
reviewed in (Shipp et al., 2013).
The studies mentioned above all provide some indirect support
to the framework for adaptive behavioural control proposed here,
which implements the plausible predictive coding and Active
Inference schemes. Furthermore, this new framework allows to
explain previous evidence and to make novel predictions that rest
on our central premise; namely, that habitual and goal-directed
behaviours are context-sensitive expressions of the same hierar-
chical (active) inference. In other words, by deﬁnition, habitual
behaviours become habitised by virtue of selecting low-level
hierarchical contingencies to make proprioceptive and interocep-
tive predictions that induce behaviour. The selection rests upon
modulatory (gain) control that we presume is reﬂected in
dopaminergic activity. Therefore, neuromodulatory (e.g., dopami-
nergic) systems should be responsible for hierarchical selection –
or mixture – of goal directed or habitual behaviour.
Empirical studies suggest that dopaminergic projections are
divergent and modulate, in a complementary fashion, higher and
lower hierarchical levels of executive (corticostriatal-thalamic)
processing. Our proposal that dopamine encodes the relative
precision of the different hierarchical levels ﬁts with such evidence.
This divergence and modulatory aspect has been discussed under RL
models (O’Doherty et al., 2015). However, we stress that, in the
current view, dopamine does not encode reward prediction errors
but the precision of prediction errors at various levels of a hierarchy.
Because precision is a ubiquitous attribute of all (hierarchically
deployed) prediction errors, its computation and broadcasting
mandates a convergent-divergent neuroanatomy and a modulatory
neurophysiology. Because, in Active Inference, optimization rests
upon reciprocal message passing, dopaminergic reference to
multiple hierarchical levels must be reciprocated by (monosynaptic
or polysynaptic) afferents from these regions.
Although other schemes for hierarchical control have been
proposed that use belief precisions or related constructs to
modulate the balance of model based and model free controllers
(Daw et al., 2005; Gershman and Daw, 2012; Lee et al., 2014;
Pezzulo et al., 2013), there are some unique features of the Active
Inference scheme that make novel and empirically testable
hypotheses. For example, in Active Inference, but not in the
aforementioned models, the optimal value of the precision
parameter (in terms of free energy minimization) is computed
on-line as part of inference. Furthermore, this precision controls
the degree of ‘‘exploration’’ of the system, because, formally, it
corresponds to the temperature parameter of softmax choice rules.
In other words, the degree of exploration is derived from ﬁrst
principles rather than being tuned to behaviour as an ad hoc
parameter. This feature of the model entails the novel prediction
that a higher precision or conﬁdence in their behavioural plans
makes animals less exploratory and thus ultimately produces
more stereotyped responses, which again speaks to habitisation.
By the same token, exploration is favoured by the presence in the
environment of cues that have epistemic value and can improve the
precision of the behavioural policies (Friston et al., 2015).
Furthermore, an idea speciﬁc to our framework is that habitual
and goal-directed behaviour form a continuum rather than a strict
dichotomy, and can cooperate rather than just compete. Consistent
with this view, recent behavioural and neural evidence supports
the idea that at any given moment action selection results from a
mixture of goal-directed and habitual control, rather than being
under the exclusive control of either of the two systems (Daw et al.,
2011; Lee et al., 2014; Otto et al., 2013). Although these data can
still be interpreted as resulting from two systems working in
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parallel and competing at a later stage, a much simpler explanation
is the idea of a unitary hierarchy scheme in which the different levels
correspond to speciﬁc degrees of complexity. In this perspective,
here the novelty of the proposal lies in the architectural scheme
itself, which does not foresee multiple or even modularized
controllers that perform heterogeneous computations plus an
arbitration mechanism, but a unique architecture that performs
homogeneous computations at all hierarchical levels.
Strictly speaking, in the proposed scheme, habitual behaviour is
not completely model free in that it continues to depend on the
(simplest) type of predictive model, of the kind ‘‘because there is a
stimulus, I expect a response’’. In Active Inference, it is the
expected response that enslaves action, thus even these simple
responses are prediction-based. Neurophysiologically, this is
compatible with the view that the dorsolateral striatum, which
has been long associated with habitual control, encodes simple
models that generate predictions based on the animal’s somato-
sensory and motor information (Pennartz et al., 2011). This scheme
lends itself to a straightforward hierarchical extension, in which
simpler models can be successively contextualized and can
incorporate elements of goal-directedness, but only when more
complex models at the higher hierarchical levels have sufﬁcient
precision to exert an inﬂuence. In other words, in this scheme there
is no need to see habitual and goal-directed behaviours as
regulated by distinct or modular processes.
The key ethological insight afforded by hierarchical Active
Inference is that all behaviours are hierarchically contextualized.
Not only does this predict that goal-directed and habitual
responses can be mixed, but also the speciﬁc conditions where
this should occur. For example, it predicts that responses should
fail to be contextualized – and thus become more habitual – when
the system is ‘taxed’ by concurrent cognitively demanding tasks, a
phenomenon that has been often interpreted in terms of
reinforcement learning theories (Gershman et al., 2014; Otto
et al., 2013). Furthermore, it predicts that under certain conditions
habitual behaviour can cease to be purely ‘model free’, thereby
disclosing evidence of its context sensitivity. For example,
phenomena like extinction and the context-dependent reactiva-
tion of extinguished associations can be explained in terms of the
(hierarchical) selection of learned associations at different periods
of exposure to the environment. For example, the extinction of a
conditioned response (say, a conditioned response of hunger and
salivation following the sound of a bell) would not derive from an
attenuation of the sound- food association, but from the fact that
the response can be contextualized by a (higher) mechanism that
learns how the probability of food availability depends on the
sound, in different contexts. In the same way, the response can be
reactivated when the right contextual conditions are detected,
thus providing the top-down mechanisms enough precision to
inﬂuence or overcome any behavioural habit developed in the
interim; see also (Gallistel, 2012).
Another set of predictions stem from the idea that action
selection and initiation depends on (multimodal) prediction errors,
not only stimuli. This view is compatible with a large body of
evidence in the ideomotor theory, according to which actions,
including those that are as simple as button presses (as used in
most human studies), are planned and selected based on their
anticipated effects (Hoffmann, 2003; Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde,
2001, 2003; Prinz, 1997; Schuetz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). By
expanding this framework to consider a role for interoceptive (not
only exteroceptive or proprioceptive) prediction errors, it may be
possible to address the link between interoceptive states and
action selection and initiation, which is currently under-explored
in the animal learning literature. Two caveats for experimental
studies investigating this link would be the largely anticipatory
nature of interoceptive events and the fact the relations between
actions and interoceptive consequences can be distal and mediated
by other (exteroceptive or proprioceptive) events, see Section 3.1.
To summarize, in this section we have presented a range of
empirical predictions that stem from our framework. Some of
these predictions are unique to this framework and could serve to
disambiguate it from alternatives. Other predictions, have been
addressed under other normative perspectives; most notably,
reinforcement learning. Perhaps the most important (novel)
contribution of our proposal is that it accommodates multifarious
phenomena, which have been addressed using different – and
often incompatible – computational approaches. Furthermore, the
framework can call upon speciﬁc process theories that are
biologically plausible; for example, predictive coding and cyber-
netic schemes (Friston, 2010). In other words, there is the potential
for an explicit connection between the normative (approximate
Bayesian inference) level and the processes underlying neurobio-
logical implementation.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we have cast ‘‘homoeostasis’’ and ‘‘behavioural
control’’ in terms of Active Inference. Under this perspective, drive
and goal achievement mandate the suppression of prediction
errors of different kinds (interoceptive, proprioceptive, and
exteroceptive) within a hierarchical architecture, and their
resolution through action. The underlying computations are driven
by a unique imperative: free energy minimization. However, when
the same free energy minimization is expressed in different
conditions (e.g., before, during or after learning of generative
models) they produce different forms of behavioural control that
correspond to reﬂexes, conditional responses and goal-directed
behaviour.
This paper establishes a link between Active Inference and
associative learning theories of animal behaviour, with potential
beneﬁts for both. On the one hand, the link extends the scope of
Active Inference to the self-regulation of bodily (as opposed to
sensorimotor) states and interoceptive inference (Pezzulo, 2013;
Seth et al., 2012). Furthermore, the link with animal learning
theories clariﬁes the nature of hierarchical inference. For example,
empirical priors in generative models correspond to ‘‘drives’’ and
‘‘goals’’ in the animal learning literature – despite the fact they are
called ‘‘beliefs’’ in the Bayesian brain literature. We have suggested
that an initial set of priors might correspond to Pavlovian values
shaped by evolution, while others are acquired by learning
generative models. On the other hand, the connection with Active
Inference suggests that the behavioural controllers proposed in the
animal learning literature might be seen as the successive
contextualization of simpler sensorimotor mechanisms in hierar-
chical generative models. This view emphasises an inclusive and
uniﬁed view of functional brain architectures, rather than a
collection of distinct and separable modules.
The homeostatic view proposed here clariﬁes why Active
Inference agents are not plagued by the (infamous) ‘‘dark room’’
problem (Friston et al., 2012b). Homeostatic regulation implies a
continuous update of empirical priors for action, whose dynamics
are dictated by the uninterrupted ﬂux of interoceptive message
passing between brain and body. This ﬂux incessantly supplies new
set points or goals – and a ‘‘moving target’’ for behaviour. Thus, any
organism equipped with a body must face reality rather than live in a
darkened room. It is exactly in this sense that (Pavlov, 2010) argues
that the brain provides the interface between the internal milieu of
the body and the external milieu of the environment. In other words,
the interoceptive state is what organisms try to maintain within a
viable range – because departures can be dangerous. Exteroceptive
states are conserved, provided this sufﬁcient to keep interoceptive
states in a physiological range – but here more variability and
G. Pezzulo et al. / Progress in Neurobiology 134 (2015) 17–3532
‘‘exploration’’ is allowed. Maintaining this delicate balance is an
important constraining factor for any robust control system,
biological or artiﬁcial.
Our analysis also grounds the abstract computations of free
energy minimization as described in theoretical neuroscience
(Friston, 2010). It suggests that free energy can be minimized at
multiple timescales: evolutionary for Pavlovian values, lifelong
learning for instrumental control (in particular habitual control),
and on-line search-based computations for goal-directed control.
In this perspective, the same free energy computations that
optimize on-line action might also be used to describe how brain
structure is optimized during evolution to embody an organism’s
needs and how it is adapted during development to retain useful
(habitual) strategies and to increase the precision of lower
hierarchical layers. These elements are all implicated in free
energy principle but here we provide a new perspective on the
mechanisms supporting that minimization and the timescales at
which they operate.
Our review of different approaches to behavioural control
highlights that some terms are used in different ways; for example,
the concept of ‘‘value’’. In the homeostatic view pursued here,
value is the complement of surprise or prediction error (because
maintaining homeostasis is ‘‘valuable’’). This implies that any state
or action can have an associated value if it links, directly or
indirectly, to the minimization of prediction error. Essentially, all
adaptive systems should pursue value through action in some way.
It is important to note that although value computations are
implemented differently in different systems, they essentially use
the same logic, which deﬁnes the normative aspect of these
behaviours. In most homeostatic theories, the value is pursued
directly by engaging (Pavlovian) innate approach or avoidance
actions. In reinforcement learning, for instance a temporal-
difference reward prediction error is used to train (habitual)
controllers that can be considered a proxy for achieving a certain
‘‘reward’’, which is in turn a proxy for restoring good homeostatic
values. In episodic controllers, action sequences that lead to
reinforcement are stored and re-enacted in similar circumstances.
In Active Inference, free energy minimization can either consider
sensory prediction errors directly, or do so indirectly by consider-
ing proxies (e.g., prediction errors at higher levels of hierarchical
models that link sensory prediction errors over modalities and
time). In short, all these approaches rest on similar or even
identical value computations, but differ in speciﬁc aspects of their
mechanistic interpretation and implementation.
Understanding the computational and neuronal basis of
motivated behaviour is a key objective of many disciplines
including psychology, neuroscience, and (neuro)economics. The
framework offered here provides principled and mechanistic
hypotheses about how the basic brain design of simpler animals
might have been reused and extended through generative models
and, while retaining essential embodied aspects, permits higher
animals to achieve open-ended goals.
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